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Introduction1 
Islam in Ethiopia has historically found itself in the shadow of the dominating Christian state. The 
intermarriage between the state and the church, with the monarchy and Christianity as the defining 
elements of Ethiopian nationhood, led to the perception of Islam as its anti-thesis; one the one hand 
because of the perceived danger Islam as an external force posed to the Christian Ethiopia, and on 
the other hand because the Ethiopian Muslims refused to let themselves become 
culturally/religiously integrated into this Ethiopianness. Whereas the state-church marriage came to 
an end with the revolution in 1974, the Muslims largely remained on the margins of society. 
Although the new Marxist regime (the Derg)2 initially was welcomed by the Muslims, the regime’s 
policy of curtailing any form of religious expressions was soon felt by each religious community, 
including the Muslim. In other words, Islam being subject to subjugation both from the Christian 
state and the Marxist project, has created a situation where Ethiopia’s Muslims have remained a 
rather invisible entity within the country, marginalised and secluded from the rest of the Ethiopian 
society. 
 
Seeking to redress the imparity of the past, The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPDRF), assuming power in 1991, introduced a policy intended to secure the rights of the 
country’s many ethnic and religious groups, both recognising the diversity and seeking to enhance 
equality within the diversity.3 As a new situation of increased religious freedom emerged, this 
inevitably paved the way for marked enthusiasm and to the boosting of religious activities from the 
side of the Muslim population. Clearly seen by the increase of new mosques all over the country, 
the emergence of Islamic organisations and Muslims becoming increasingly visible in public life – 
the new political climate led to the surfacing of a new consciousness and new religious affiliations 
(Østebø 1998, 443f). The revitalisation of religious virtues, the articulation of religious identities, 
the reproduction of religious symbols and the demarcation of religious boundaries have moreover 
paved the way for increased intra-religious plurality and inter-religious tensions, in turn sparking 
renewed focus on Islam both from the Ethiopian (Christian) public and from foreign observers. 
Unfortunately, the lack of in-depth studies on contemporary Islam in Ethiopia has clearly impinged 
on the debate on Islam in Ethiopia, where inherent biases and unfounded assumptions dominate. 
 
Through a discussion of three major Islamic reform movements, this paper intends to provide much 
needed insights of the complexity of current developments within the Muslim community in 
Ethiopia. Paying attention to the recruitment of followers, the ideological content and the 
development of these movements in the last decade, this contribution argues that these movements 
were pivotal for the articulation of religious affiliation and the construction of identity in post-1991 
Ethiopia. Moreover, the paper seeks to demonstrate how these processes were determined by 
complex interactions between factors inherent in the local contexts and the trans-local currents 
reaching Ethiopia in this period. Situating the religious development within the wider political, 
ethnical, cultural and societal discourses in contemporary Ethiopia, a main point of this contribution 
                                                     
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the conference; Religion on the Borders: New Challenges in the Academic 
Study of Religion, Södertörn University-college, Stockholm, 19-22 April, 2007. I am grateful to Anne Sofie Roald (Malmö 
University and Chr. Michelsen Institute) for her constructive comments to an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 Lit. meaning – “committee”, signifying the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces taking control in 1974. The 
term has moreover been applied for the Marxist regime in power from 1974 to 1991.  
3 One need to be reminded that while these rights were asserted in the 1994 constitution, there exists a great discrepancy 
between the stated policy and the regime’s practice. For more details, see (Tronvoll 2000) 
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is to argue for the need to consider the locality in discerning wider currents within contemporary 
Islam.4  
Questions, answers and the quest for identity 
In an attempt to conceptualise this development, I believe the process of objectification drawn from 
Eickelman and Piscatori serves as a relevant point of departure. Situated in the so-called modern 
era, where the crumbling of traditional authorities and structures impinge on shared understandings, 
the process of objectification is described as a process where basic questions are objectified and put 
to the forefront of the believers’ minds, and where he or she is forced to explicitly formulate 
questions such as ‘What are my religion? Why is it important to my life? and How does my belief 
guide my conduct?’. The outcome of this process is in turn said to be the surfacing of religion as ‘a 
self-contained system’, articulated and objectified by the adherents. The process is moreover 
perceived as opening up for a new religious discourse and involving a broader part of actors in the 
reconfiguration of religious symbols (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, 38f).5 While Eickelman and 
Piscatori underscore the formulations of questions, said to have shaped ‘the discourse and practices 
of Muslims’, I believe that although the asking of questions obviously would be intrinsic to the 
process of objectification, we need to recognise the aspect of new and alternative religious ideas 
being introduced. In the process of objectification, leading to the articulation of religion as a ‘self-
contained system’, distinguished from other systems, the formulations of questions would not be 
sufficient; there need also be answers. As this particular case demonstrates, the introduction of 
different new ideologies has informed the process of objectification in Ethiopia in the sense of 
creating a variety of articulated religious affiliations and moreover increased the diversity within the 
Muslim community.6  
 
The availability of new alternatives has been augmented by the constant flow of ideas intrinsically 
linked to the global era; ideas crossing spatial and cultural boundaries at a range and at a pace 
unprecedented in history (Bauman 1998; Schreiter 1997). A pivotal aspect of this movement of 
ideas is the jetlag occurring by their remoulding within respective localities. Whereas the 
recognition of the spatial dimension in discourses over globalisation in general, and with regard to 
Islam in particular is to be welcomed (Asad 1986; Eickelman 1982), there is an apparent risk of the 
global/local replacing the earlier traditional/modern dichotomy (Probst, et al. 2002). The concept of 
glocalisation has proven helpful in this regard (Robertsen 1992). Recognising the parallel 
interrelation of processes; localisation taking place universally, and universalising being played 
locally, this concept enables us to come to terms with the inherent complexity of the movement of 
ideas and the ways they are being remoulded within respective localities. Seen from the perspective 
of the locality, this contribution intends to demonstrate how this dialectic of trans-local/universal 
ideas mutually affect, and are informed by each other, determining the outcome and the content of 
the process of objectification.  
 
Lastly, the process of objectification needs to be situated in a broader discourse of identification. 
Discharging the notion of identity as fixed entity, and construing identity as constantly constructed 
in an on-going process through the individual’s interactions with his or her surroundings (Hall 
                                                     
4 The data for this paper was collected through an extensive fieldwork carried out in Bale from January 2005 to December 
2007. 
5 The term objectification is also used by Berger & Luckman and Bourdieu, although in a different manner (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 2003). 
6 The articulation of questions, signifying the existence of crisis, and the availability of new ideas, indicating solution is 
analogous to what Westerlund’s thesis of ‘discontent’ and ‘content’. Whereas the former represent various aspects of 
grievance, the latter constitutes constructive factors forwarded by the advocates of Islamic movements and gaining 
attraction among disgruntled recipients (Westerlund 1997).  
CMI WORKING PAPER THE QUESTION OF BECOMING WP 2007: 8 
 3 
1996a; Hall 1996b), this process will here be treated in relation to the two following aspects. First, a 
rather intense and highly politicised debate on ethnicity in Ethiopia has clearly affected the 
developments within the religious sphere. Whereas there on the one hand is a tendency of 
separating ethnic and religious boundaries by distinguishing social relations within a primordialist 
narrative from religious motivated evaluations, the two have on the other hand mutually informed 
each other, contributing to the creation and reinforcement of both ethnic and intra-religious 
boundaries. Secondly, the process of identification needs to be related to the inter-religious situation 
of Ethiopia and the subordinate position of Muslims caused by the historical hegemony of the 
Christians. Informed by the notion of identity being constructed through the dialectic interaction 
between individuals and their surroundings; constant negotiations between the individual’s internal 
self identification within the group to which he or she belongs and the external categorisation 
applied to this group by the other (Jenkins 1994; Jenkins 1996), my argument is that the Christian 
hegemony has had clear impact on the development of Islam in contemporary Ethiopia. Through a 
largely derogatory categorisation of the Muslims by the Christian other, the former has developed a 
distinct self-definition seeing themselves as inferior to the latter. Although this notion currently is 
being challenged, it has proven to be strong, having clear implications for the confidence and 
resources available for the Muslims to carve out public space and to redress the status quo.  
Post-1991 Ethiopia  
The new policies introduced by EPDRF in 1991, ended the restrictions on Hajj and on import of 
religious literature, allowed the construction of mosques and enabled the creation of Islamic 
organisations, newspapers and magazines (Hussein Ahmed 1994, 791). Naturally, the candour that 
followed the downfall of the Derg had dramatic consequences for the Muslim community, 
providing them with public space unprecedented in the country’s history. Among the Islamic 
organisations established in the early 1990s, we find the Ethiopian Muslim Unity Association, the 
Ethiopian Muslim Democratic Movement, the Ethiopian Muslim Youth Association and the 
Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (Hussein Ahmed 1994, 792f). Most of them were 
relatively short-lived, and must be seen in relation to the enthusiasm that existed at that time. As 
expressed by one of my informants; ‘every single person was establishing his own party in these 
days’. Secondly, Islamic newspapers and magazines surfaced, printing commentaries intended to 
refute different allegations and ‘misinterpretations’ of Islam, either in the form of answers to 
various articles published in local Amharic newspapers, or as independent comments on 
controversies between Christians and Muslims (Hussein Ahmed 1994, 793; Hussein Ahmed 1998, 
98f). Thirdly, several large public demonstrations were to be seen in the streets of Addis Ababa. 
Whereas many of these demonstrations addressed internal affairs within the Muslim community, 
there were others more directly concerned with Islam in relation to society and politics. A large 
demonstration in November 1994 demanded among others, the inclusion of the shari’a-law as one 
of the basis for the new Ethiopian constitution, and challenged the ban of head-scarves for girls in 
high schools.7  
 
Many of these activities were closely linked to, and even carried out by reform movements rapidly 
expanding in these years, movements that became important in shaping an increasingly diversified 
Muslim community. 
 
                                                     
7 There is a general ban on wearing of (Muslim) head-scarves throughout Ethiopia, apparently not codified in any written 
form. Demands for repealing of this ban have repeatedly been forwarded by the Muslim community in many parts of the 
country.  
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Islamic reform movements 
There are three main reform-movements to be discerned in today’s Ethiopia. Although some of 
them surfaced some decades back, common for them all is that they have gained their momentum in 
the post-1991 period. 
 
The one receiving most attention is the Salafi movement, ideologically and financially affiliated to 
Saudi Arabia.8 This is also the movement with the longest history in Ethiopia, having its 
antecedents back to the late 1940s. Although much of its initial history remains in the dark, it seems 
clear that it first appeared in the south-eastern part of the country, then following different paths of 
expansion.9 Erlich argues in a recent study that Salafism gained foothold in Ethiopia through an 
increasing number of Ethiopians returning from the hajj during the Italian occupation (1935-1942). 
In particular, he mentions a certain Sheikh Yusuf Abd’ al-Rahman of Harar, claimed to be the 
leading figure spreading Salafism in Harar and Ethiopia (Erlich 2007, 81). Although important, his 
role should not be overestimated. Whereas Salafism spread from Harar to its vicinity, centres for 
Salafi teaching were also soon established among the Oromo of Hararge. Some have argued that the 
introduction of Khat10 as a cash-crop in Hararge facilitated the increase of hajj among the Oromo, 
who in turn returned to disseminate Salafi ideas among their kinsmen, ideas which then were 
brought to Arsi and Bale.11 Later, in the 1960s, an increasing number of Oromo from Bale and Arsi 
returning from religious studies in Saudi, played a pivotal role in further expanding Salafism in 
these areas.12 Similar developments were seen in Addis Ababa and in areas such as Wollo – 
although to a lesser degree. This means that Salafism in Ethiopia from the beginning had the form 
of a home-grown movement, in the sense that the new ideas were disseminated by Ethiopians, and 
not by foreign missionaries. The ideological links to Saudi were obvious, and to some degree also 
the financial. Yet the important role played by locals had clear impacts on the way the Salafi 
doctrines were introduced into the particular locality. 
 
The growth of the Salafi movement was to a large degree checked by the Derg regime. Guided by a 
Marxist ideology, the Derg sought to curb religious activities in general, yet never managing to 
eradicate religion. One important aspect for the movement’s survival was its decentred character. 
There was no structured organisation which the regime could interfere in or ban; everything was on 
an informal basis, with the mosque as the main arena for disseminating Salafi ideas. Whereas 
religious change was to be temporarily postponed during the Derg, this was to change dramatically 
from 1991. The Salafi movement, which already had gained foothold in Oromo-speaking areas such 
as Bale and Arsi, soon attracted a large  number of followers in these areas, and gradually gained 
similar support in other parts of the country; Harar, Jimma, Wollo and Addis Ababa. Obviously, the 
new regime’s policy on religion enabling the Ethiopian Salafis to strengthen their contacts with the 
outside world was crucial for the expansion of the ideology; disseminated through the import of 
literature, by Ethiopians receiving education abroad and through a growing number of madrasas. In 
                                                     
8 The term commonly used in Ethiopia is Wahhabi Islam. Because its followers prefer to be called Salafis, I have chosen 
this term. Other terms used are ahl al-Sunna or tawhid-followers. Tawhid refers to the absolute oneness and singularity of 
Allah, something strongly emphasised in Salafi Islam. The term Salafi Islam in this context refers to the teaching of 
Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahab and the ideology of Saudi Arabia. It should not be confused with the 19th century Salafi 
movement of Muhammed Abduh and Rashid Rida in Egypt. 
9 Few studies have been made on the Salafi-movement in Ethiopia. For some details on its developments in Harar, Arsi, 
Addis Ababa, Wollo and Bale, see respectively; (Desplat 2005; Temam Haji 2002) (Abbink 2007; Bauer Oumer 2006; 
Østebø 2007a; Østebø 2007b). 
10 Khat (Catha edulis) is the name for a shrub with evergreen leaves containing an amphetamine-like stimulant. Khat is 
chewed all over the Horn of Africa, and in Yemen, giving the users a mild inebriation. 
11 Ahmed Zekaria, personal communication; Addis Ababa 25.9.2006 
12 For more details on the initial development of Salafism in Arsi and Bale, see (Temam Haji 2002; Østebø 2007b). 
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the case of Bale, the Salafi factor was moreover felt by the arrival of the qawettis, Oromo returning 
from exile in Somalia in the early 1990s, advocating reform in line with Salafi doctrines.13  
 
In the capital, it was the Ethiopian Muslim Youth Association that became the main promoter of the 
Salafi ideology. Established in the early 1990s and led by Sheikh Sayid Ahmed Mustafa and 
Muhammed Usman successively, the association had initially only loose connections with Salafi 
Islam. However, as funding from Saudi increased, and links with the World Association of Muslim 
Youth (WAMY) in Riyadh were established, the Salafi affiliation became more obvious. As 
observed by one of my informants; ‘The Saudis were the only ones making funds available at that 
time’. Also important was Islamic Da’wa & Knowledge Association. Established in 1992 by Sheikh 
Tahir Abdulqadir from Bale, it played a decisive role in translating and publishing religious 
literature, constructing mosques and supporting various forms of da’wa.14 Besides these 
organisations, the Salafi-movement was represented by a group of Oromo ulama returning from 
Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s and settling in Aiyr Tena, one of the suburbs of Addis Ababa. 
Individuals such as Dr. Jeylan Galata were highly respected in Salafi circles throughout the country, 
and were moreover exerting substantial influence on the young Oromo residing in Addis Ababa. 
Although both the individuals and the association mentioned above received funds from Saudi and 
the Gulf states, the financial links were of a highly informal or private character, making it difficult 
to determine the exact size of the funds, how they were channelled and how they were spent.15 A 
good example in this regard is the Bale International University soon to be constructed at the cost of 
105 mill Birr (US$ 12, 3 mill), where Dr. Jeylan Galata is mentioned as one of several ‘Ethiopian 
investors together with some Kuwaiti businessmen’.16 In contrast, a more formalised relationship 
between the Saudis and Ethiopian Salafis is found in the Awaliyah School & Mission Centre. 
Supported by the Saudi-controlled World Muslim League (MWL) since 1966, the formal ownership 
of the school was in 1993 transferred to International Islamic Relief Organisation, a branch of 
MWL (Bauer Oumer 2006, 79; Nega Aba Jebal 1986). Although foreign funding has played an 
important role, its impact should not be overestimated. Salafism in Ethiopia has to a large degree 
been based on local resources, where many of the constructed mosques, the madrasas and the 
various forms of da’wa have been financed locally. Further, as a result of global and regional 
events, the Ethiopian government has in congruence with US policy curbed much of Saudi’s 
activities and cash-flow into Ethiopia, reducing its influence considerably (Shinn 2005, 110). 
 
The second main reform-movement is the Jama’at al-Tabligh. Internationally, this is the world’s 
largest Islamic da'wa movement, established by Sheikh Muhammed Iliyas in India in 1929.17 With 
hardly any studies available, our knowledge on its history and activities in Ethiopia is very 
limited.18 Some reports claim that the Tabligh was introduced to Ethiopia by South African and 
Kenyan Indian Tabligh-missionaries in the 1970s. Their activities were facilitated by a certain 
Sheikh Musa, resulting in the expansion of the movement among the Gurage community in Addis 
Ababa. Similar to the Salafi-movement, the Tabligh’s activities remained limited during the Derg-
period, before the movement emerged with increased strength after 1991. Led by its founder in 
Ethiopia, Sheikh Musa and with its centre (markaz) in the Kolfe area, the Tabligh has grown to be 
                                                     
13 During the fighting between Somali guerrillas and the government leading up to the Ogaden war (1977-78), many 
Oromo sided with the Somali; their defeat forcing a substantial part of the Oromo population of Bale to flee to Somalia 
where they lived as refugees throughout the Derg period. 
14 Da’wa – the Islamic call usually signifies propagation and preaching with the objective to bring a person to Islam (or to 
the correct observance of Islam). 
15 Erlich has discussed the issue of Saudi funding, where according to Muslim World League sources, money has been 
spent on education, construction of mosques and various development activities. Yet very little is mentioned on the size of 
the funding and how it was channelled (Erlich 2007, 186f).  
16 For more details, see (The Ethiopian Herald 2007). 
17 For a detailed study on the Tabligh movement in general, see (Sikand 2002) 
18 This section on the Tabligh is based on my own limited fieldwork and research done by Bauer Oumar (Bauer Oumer 
2006). 
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one of the main movements of Islamic reform in Ethiopia. The da’wa is now conducted in a more 
organised and extensive manner, with Tabligh missionaries being sent out to various parts of the 
country; either on three- or forty-days journeys; sometimes in small groups, sometimes in busloads. 
In compliance with Tabligh principles, the missionaries are making house calls (jawla), calling 
people to attend the prayers in the mosque. Tabligh groups (jama’a) are subsequently established in 
the mosque, serving as bases for further da’wa. Also in accordance with the Tabligh’s principle of 
self-reliance, the missionaries of the Tabligh are supporting themselves, making the movement 
independent from any outside funding. On the other hand, the movement has improved its contact 
with the wider Tabligh world by receiving Tabligh missionaries, particularly from the Indian 
communities in Kenya and South Africa, and by sending representatives to annual Tabligh 
conferences in Pakistan. When Sheikh Musa passed away in 2002, the leadership was organised in a 
more collective manner, with a committee exerting the overall responsibility. Yet, in spite of 
increased outreach-activities, the Tabligh-movement in Ethiopia has largely remained confined 
within the Gurage community in Addis Ababa. Attempts to establish centres in other areas have met 
resistance, particularly in Oromiya, where the Salafis are dominating.   
 
The third movement of reform emerging in the early 1990s, here labelled as the Intellectualist 
movement, is somewhat difficult to categorise. Highly informal and devoid of any organisational 
structure, it evolved around certain individuals advocating a set of ideas rather than initiating a 
particular movement. Surfacing in the campuses of Addis Ababa University and at other institutions 
of higher learning, it soon attracted students in large numbers, thus acting unofficially as the 
Muslim Student-Movement. Organised in small jama’as, and led by individual figures referred to as 
amirs, and by offering lectures and initiating study-circles, the movement became important in 
fighting for the rights of Muslim students. Outside the campuses, the movement was able to exert 
influence through public lectures and contributions in the Bilal magazine in the early 1990s. 
Further, prominent members of the movement have been active publishing books through the 
Najashi Publishers. Although prominent individuals within the movement still are disseminating 
their ideas through lectures and seminars in Addis Ababa and its surroundings, the movement has 
lost much of its strength in the campuses. Instead, it has remained a rather elitist phenomenon; its 
leaders and followers mainly being young university graduates and urban intellectuals.  
Attracting audiences  
Attempts to construe the recruitment to contemporary Islamic movements have often forwarded 
factors such as the failure of modernisation (Dekmejian 1995; Faksh 1997), socio-economic strains 
like poverty and illiteracy (Ansari 1984; Munson Jr 1986), the influence of Western culture (Keddie 
1994) and alienation from both traditional virtues and modern life (Waltz 1986). Although such 
factors are of clear relevance, they have to be situated in the particular context under question. 
Seeking to understand the appeal Islamic reform movements have in Ethiopia, we therefore need to 
consider the traditional position of Islam, the impact of the country’s recent political history and the 
political and cultural climate created by the current regime.  
 
Recent political developments have had great impacts on a whole generation of Ethiopians. Starting 
in the last decades of the imperial period, a process of increased modernisation moulded the borders 
of locality, bringing the trans-local context closer, and thus opening up for increased cultural and 
religious plurality. The pace of this development changed dramatically with the coming of the Derg; 
promoting schooling, initiating a vast literacy campaign and transforming both political and cultural 
institutions by organising the people into numerous modern bureaucratic associations. The Derg 
moreover contributed to the introduction of modernism as a concept in the minds of the people, 
where the past was interpreted by the present, and the future was something to be shaped by the 
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labour of man. In other words, reality was to be seen as increasingly rationalised, which inevitably 
came to challenge existing systems explaining this reality, and to weaken previous cultural virtues 
and cultural institutions. Either because of the regime’s revisionist policy, where they viewed most 
of previous culture as remnants of a feudal past, or because of the state-enforced modernism, the 
past lost much of its relevance in the minds of people – particularly among the young generation. 
Attending modern education and exposed to Marxist ideology, this generation found themselves 
alienated from their past, yet at the same time not full-fledged Marxist converts. Then, as the Lenin-
statues were toppled and the Red-stars were removed in 1991, a whole generation of Ethiopians to a 
large degree found themselves in what can be characterised as a cultural vacuum, highly receptive 
of new orientations. Consequently, these previous experiences came to produce fertile ground for 
new orientations – such as the movements discussed here – to attract a variety of audiences.  
 
Recruitment to the Salafi movement has been rather limited in urban areas. The main arena of 
recruitment in towns has been the mosque, where particular mosques dominated by a Salafi imam or 
home to individuals providing teaching along Salafi lines, became important bridgeheads for the 
da’wa. In Addis Ababa the da’wa is also done through the spreading of audio- and video-cassettes. 
In contrast, the movement had more success in the rural areas, where it has been able to recruit a 
large number of young males, particularly in Oromo-speaking areas. Many are recruited through an 
increasingly elaborated system of rural religious schools (jama’a) dominated by a Salafi ulama 
either educated in Saudi, or disciples of others with training from Saudi. Taught in the Qu'ran and 
the main Islamic subjects (ilm), they are simultaneously exposed to Salafi doctrines and in turn 
becoming adherents to this form of Islam. Yet at the same time, this network of rural religious 
schools represents a continuation of Islam where it serves to transfer and maintain Islamic religious 
knowledge. In an environment, such as in the rural areas of Oromiya where Islamic scholarship 
traditionally remained largely superficial and where practical adherence to the main principles of 
Islam was nominal, Salafism has thus become the channel for a renewed focus on religious virtues, 
and could therefore be seen as a continuous process of Islamisation. Furthermore, Salafism could 
also be construed as means to social change. In contrast to the urban youth, who had better access to 
higher education, the limited possibility for those from the rural areas makes religious education the 
only pathway for social mobility. Important in this regard is that while both the urban and the rural 
youth may be disconnected from their cultural past, those in towns are exposed to a variety of 
alternatives, whereas in the rural areas – choice is limited to an orientation of a religious character. 
Upon completing their training, many of the students (darasa) take up teaching, whereas some will 
continue as farmers, get engaged in petty-trading or simply migrate to urban areas. This means there 
is a rather high degree of turn-over in the recruitment, and it seems clear that although most of them 
would continue subscribe to the Salafi ideas, many are likely to loose the initial zealousness. 
However, those who migrate to larger urban areas, like Addis Ababa, usually find their settlement 
in areas already dominated by Salafis, which in turn enables them to maintain their religious 
affiliation.  
 
As already mentioned, the Tabligh in Ethiopia is dominated by the Gurage Muslims, much involved 
in trading and found in the Mercato area of Addis Ababa. The movement seems to have an appeal to 
most members within this community, regardless of age, sex or social status. Yet, those getting 
involved in da’wa are likely to be young males; students or employees in various sectors. Whereas 
the traders may be engaged in at least the short-term da’wa, they are more important in upholding 
the Tabligh-principle of self-reliance; providing financial support for the activities. The Tabligh is 
also able to benefit from the extensive network of Gurage traders found all over the country, having 
an important supportive function for the travelling Tabligh missionaries.  
 
The Intellectualist movement in Ethiopia is in contrast to the Salafi movement an urban 
phenomenon. Its base is the urban youth who have attended the formal school-system before 
entering higher education in the capital. Thus, rather than being exposed to religious education, 
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these are individuals exposed to urban life, subject to secular education and assumingly being more 
aquatinted with modernity than their co-religionists from the rural areas. Entering the campuses 
where they received lectures on religion and were encouraged to study books about Islam, they soon 
found themselves exposed to various trends within Islam and involved in discussions about 
religious virtues and Islam in relation to different aspects of modern life. Thus, the movement has 
an intellectualist characteristic from the beginning, stimulating the recipients to study and analyse 
Islam in relation to their own life-situation. Prior to joining the movement, many of the adherents to 
the Intellectualist movement were indifferent to the obligatory religious duties and rather 
uninformed about the basic principles of Islam. Moreover, dissatisfied with and alienated from the 
Islam of their parents, this was often described as a ‘superstitious’ form of Islam. In other words, 
the movements found fertile ground among those disconnected from their past, disgruntled with 
their own lack of religious orientation and caught up in a contradictory modern world.  
 
The emergence of these movements and their interactions with their audience, clearly demonstrate 
how the process of objectification led to the development of multiple ideological directions. As 
these movements occurred in different spatial and cultural contexts, often representing the sole 
ideological alternative, they engaged their prospective audience in a dialectical process of creating a 
sense of meaning and belonging in a largely fragmented reality. Meaning is obviously not to be 
restricted to a cognitive sphere, rather ‘what is important in most humans in their everyday lives is 
not to have a well reasoned and coherent world view but rather to have one that functions 
emotionally’ (Thurfjell 2003, 28). Where these movements provided the members with ways to 
articulate allegiance to the Islamic virtues and to construct a sense of belonging, it is interesting to 
see how the different movements, with their particular ideological emphasis, are attracting followers 
from different sectors of the society. Yet, it needs also to be underscored that meaning also has its 
more mundane flavour. Whereas the rural youth are using the Salafi jama’as as a tool for social 
mobility, recruitment to the movements is also connected with affinity and loyalty to another issue 
of belonging; that of ethnicity – which we will return to more in details later.  
Ideological content 
As the word ‘reform’ implies, the main objective for any reform movement is to initiate change. 
This involves evaluative perceptions of the existent reality, a determined agenda and a strategy for 
change and reflections on an idealised future.19 Constituting the movement’s message, this must be 
articulated and disseminated in a manner resonating with a prospective audience and arranged in a 
certain way to produce intersubjective meaning and facilitate the movement’s goals. This process 
has its clear reciprocal character, where the protagonists of an ideology on one hand are 
emphasising certain aspects having particular relevance in a given setting, and where the recipients 
on the other are choosing and selectively interpreting parts of the system seen as relevant to their 
locality and as providing meaningful answers to their questions. Through this interactive process of 
negotiations, both the protagonists and the audience draw from indigenous symbols, language and 
identities – as well as from trans-local ideologies. As various movements, like these under question 
here, are framed in different ideological narratives and are moreover interacting with disparate 
audiences, the outcome is bound to be of a complex heterogeneous character.  
 
As expected, the Salafis have been the most ardent critics of traditional Islamic practices in 
Ethiopia. The movement has fiercely attacked what they regard as inclusion of indigenous elements 
                                                     
19 Introducing the term ‘ideological vision’, Gouldner connects the phenomena of religion and ideology, constituting a 
modern construct focused on man’s effort to make change the world (Gouldner 1976). Elaborating on this, Lawrence 
claims that contemporary reform movements represent religious ideologies by which practices and aspirations are ‘framed 
within a discourse that authorizes action through scriptural, creedal and moral references’ (Lawrence 1989, 97).  
CMI WORKING PAPER THE QUESTION OF BECOMING WP 2007: 8 
 9 
and Sufi interpretations of Islam, in particular the pilgrimages to various shrines and celebrations of 
mawlid. These practices, as well as Sufism in general – the main antagonism to Salafism, has been 
refuted as shirk; as deviations from the true faith. Moreover, the Salafis have agitated for a stricter 
observance of Islam, with the inclusion of various aspects of the sunna as compulsory (wajib), 
notably the growing of beard, the wearing of trousers above the ankles (isbal) and females covering 
their faces (niqab). This prescribed observance of the sunnah has inevitably produced conflicts 
between senior and more zealous young Salafis, where the former are accused of corruption and 
religious laxness, and where the latter are labelled as too extreme. The Salafi-movement in Ethiopia 
has in general subscribed to the mainstream Salafi doctrines of Saudi Arabia, where prominent 
figures such as Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Abdallah bin Baz, Sheikh Muhammed bin  Salih al-Uthaymin 
and the Albanian Sheikh Muhammed Nasr al-Din al-Albany are highly regarded. However, with the 
appearance of the Takfir wal Hijrah group in 1994-95, it seemed that the Salafi-movement would 
move in a new direction.20 Introduced by a certain Sheikh Muhammed Amin returning from exile in 
Sudan 1992, the movement grew strong in the northern town of Gondar in the years 1994-1997 – 
before it spread to Addis Ababa, gaining foothold in the mosque in Terro, a northern suburb of the 
city. The Takfir was soon able to attract quite a number of followers among the young generation, 
and for a period the issue of Takfir was on everybody’s lips. Distancing themselves from the 
Christians, they also severed their connections to other Muslims, refusing to pray with them. In 
accordance with the principles of Takfir in general; the criticism of shirk among fellow Muslims, 
who subsequently are labelled as non-believers (kafirs), the Takfir even refuted other Salafis as 
kafirs, including the leading Salafi ulama of Addis Ababa. Moving in an increasingly exclusivist 
direction, the group consequently found themselves cut off by the rest of the Salafi movement. As 
the Salafi ulama of Aiyr Tena publicly denounced the movement, and a young scholar named 
Hassan Taju in 2002 published a book fiercely criticising Takfir, the group lost much of its 
momentum, and when its main leader passed away in 2004, Takfir lost its real strength. A more 
recent schism was introduced by the so-called Madhkaliyyah group, adhering to the Salafi scholar, 
Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madhkali of Saudi.21 Organised around a certain radiologist in Mercato, the group 
established their own organisation, Najiah (salvation) in the end of 2006.22 Very little is known 
about the Madhkaliyyah group, other that they are seen as advocating for a stricter version of 
Salafism in opposition to the more established part of the movement, as well as being ardently 
critical to the teaching of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
In accordance with the movement’s general principles, the Tabligh in Ethiopia has sought to 
enhance the Muslims’ commitment to Islam, by calling them to attend the prayers in the mosque, to 
observe the fasting and to uphold the six main principles of Tabligh.23 The Tabligh movement has 
in general emphasised the study of Islam, arguing that knowledge should not be limited to the 
domain of the ulama. Yet, the study of Islam within Tabligh in Ethiopia has not been much 
elaborated, signifying that Tabligh is a movement focusing more on the practical aspects of da’wa 
and less on doctrinal questions. In Ethiopia, the movement is not represented by any ulama or 
school, it does not provide religious training on a higher level and is generally avoiding debates on 
ideology. In fact, the anonymous character of the Tabligh has made the movement to be overlooked 
                                                     
20 Takfir wal Hijrah first emerged in Egypt in 1977, where its leader, Shukri Mustafa advocated a radical interpretation of 
Islam, defying any Muslim except his own followers as kafirs. In Sudan there are reports that the group was behind 
several attacks on mosques in the 1990s, and that they tried to assassinate Osama bin Laden in 1994. Most of the Takfir 
activists were subsequently killed in confrontations with Sudanese security forces, as was their leader. See (Carney 2005, 
122) 
21 Sheikh Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madhkali is a mainstream, quietist scholar close to the Salafi establishment in Saudi. Through 
his writing, he has launched staunch criticism upon the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayid Qutb. Sheikh Rabi also has his 
own webpage: www.rabee.net.   
22 According to information given to me in an interview 13 October 2006, the Madhkaliyyah group was working on 
establishing this organisation. I have not been able to verify if it in fact has been established.  
23 These six principles were formulated by Sheikh Muhammed Iliyas, the founder of Tabligh – said to guide the believer 
in his or her daily life (Ali 2003; Elahi 1989). 
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by most observers. The Tabligh has moreover not voiced much criticism towards ‘traditional’ 
Islamic practices; rather they are allowed to continue within the movement. The migrant Gurage 
community in Addis Ababa has brought many of their Sufi practices with them, where in particular 
veneration of the main Gurage saints are sought to be maintained within the urban community. In 
turn, this signifies the movement’s highly pragmatic character; combining reform with certain 
flexibility towards the past, and the incorporation and rereading of Sufi elements within a Tabligh 
framework. 
 
Initially linked to the Tabligh movement, the Intellectualist movement gradually developed an 
ideological attachment to the Muslim Brotherhood, where the views of Hassan al-Banna, and in 
particular that of Yusuf al-Qaradawi were disseminated among its followers. This was reflected 
through the spread of Muslim Brotherhood literature, through public lectures and through 
contributions in Bilal magazine. Yet the Intellectualists were careful never to mention the names of 
the Muslim Brotherhood or its ideologues, and were moreover often using the pen-name, Najat Abd 
al-Qadir when writing in Bilal (Hussein Ahmed 1998, 98). This was partly done to avoid becoming 
too closely associated with a particular movement, and partly out of fear that being associated with 
the Muslim Brotherhood would spark interventions from the side of the government. It needs to be 
noted that the Muslim Brotherhood was never formally established in Ethiopia. Rather, it was the 
ideas of the movement that were disseminated; ideas being selectively chosen and interpreted within 
the particular Ethiopian context. In contrast to the two other movements, the Intellectualist 
movement has repeatedly emphasised Islam as a resource for man’s life in the temporal and secular 
world. Islam is perceived as a comprehensive religion, being relevant for all aspects of life, and 
where the Muslim is thus expected to be active in various sectors of societal and political life. The 
believer should participate in the capacity of being a member of society, where his or her conduct is 
to be guided by Islam, and whereby the society will be influenced by the Islamic virtues. 
Furthermore, the Intellectualists have been active working for a better parity with the Christian 
population. Referring to past discrimination, they are arguing for the need to mend the past 
injustices and work for equal representation of Muslims in public life. At the same time they are 
also emphasising the need for tolerance and peaceful co-existence between the country’s religious 
groups; claiming that this can only be achieved through just and equal representation of the two 
groups. In addition to this underlining of the more mundane aspects, the Intellectualists have 
moreover a clear inclination towards the more spiritual side of Islam. Similar to the Salafis, the 
Intellectualists are challenging the traditional popularised versions of Ethiopian Sufism, yet 
acknowledging Sufism to be a legitimate part of Islamic tradition and necessary for man’s piety. In 
contrast to the ‘traditional’ Sufism practiced in Ethiopia, a sort of ‘modern’ Sufism is advocated, not 
affiliated to any tariqah, but which is focused on individual religious practices as enhancing one’s 
spiritual life in a materialistic world. As expressed by one of my informants; ‘Sufism is a way to 
combine modern life and religion. With Sufism I can live close to Allah, it gets personal’.  
 
The Intellectualists’ inclination towards Sufism is a clear illustration of how locality contributes in 
shaping the ideology informing the very same locality. Coming from areas with an elaborated 
tradition of Islamic (Sufi) scholarship, such as Wollo, its adherents have come to view this tradition 
as an important resource in the reconfiguration of Islamic virtues and symbols within a modern 
setting. Furthermore, a similar tendency is found in their view of the Muslim Brotherhood; 
underscoring Hassan al-Banna’s linking to the Sufi turuq in Egypt. Consequently, indigenous 
traditions are re-constructed into the present, made to fit impulses from a different context; both 
being negotiated and moulded within the cultural locality of the Intellectualists. 
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Islam, inter-religious relations and politics  
Yet, one of the most noticeable areas in which locality affects the ideological content of these 
movements is the relationship to the Christian population and to Ethiopian politics.  Many Ethiopian 
and foreign observers have interpreted current developments on Islam as a process where Islam in 
Ethiopia is becoming increasingly politicised, and where so-called Islamic fundamentalism is said 
to surface in the ranks of Ethiopian Muslims.24 With reference to the growth in the number of 
mosques all over the country and to the increasing number of Muslims holding governmental and 
public positions, Ethiopian Muslims are accused of aspiring for political power based on radical 
religious ideas. Quite strong statements are forwarded in the public debate, where madrasas are 
charged of being ‘brain washing sessions and jihad factories nurturing potential bin Ladens…’ and 
where ‘innocent Ethiopian kids are taken to various countries in the Middle East for military 
training, and then return home to participate in the meticulously planned and widely coordinated 
jihad’ (Alem Zele-Alem 2003). Consequently, currents within the Islamic community are seen to 
have severe negative impacts for the Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia, a relationship which 
historically has largely been devoid of any major conflicts. Claiming that Ethiopia’s ‘contemporary 
religious equilibrium is collapsing very quickly’, and that ‘contemporary religious militancy should 
be seen as a wholly new phenomenon and a threat to peace, stability and independence’, a sense of 
fear is clearly discernable among the Christian population.25  
 
The Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia have repeatedly been celebrated as peaceful, tolerant 
and pragmatic. Yet, as also Hussein Ahmed has argued, there is a clear need for a reappraisal of this 
relationship (Hussein Ahmed 2006), something which certainly becomes imperative as the 1990s 
saw an increment of inter-religious frictions. Tensions between Christians and Muslims have often 
revolved around the construction of mosques and churches, and in relation to public celebration of 
religious holidays.26 Allocations of plots for churches and mosques have produced protests from 
Muslims and Christians respectively, in some cases leading to clashes between the two 
communities. Already in 1992 controversies arouse in the ancient town of Axum over the Muslims’ 
request for permission to construct a mosque there. Claiming that Axum was a sacred place, the 
Christian clerics strongly opposed the proposal. Subsequent clashes were quelled by the security 
forces, and still there is no mosque in Axum. Conflicts over the construction of mosques and 
churches have recurred all through the last decade, with the latest one occurring in August 2006 in 
downtown Addis Ababa, where the demolition of an alleged unlawfully built mosque led to angry 
demonstrations. Controversies over celebrations of religious holidays have often been sparked by 
spatial proximity, like that of Kamise (Wollo) where a procession of Christians celebrating 
Epiphany came too close to the Muslims preparing for prayer at the town’s mosque, resulting in 
skirmishes with casualties on both sides. Tensions between Christians and Muslims clearly 
exacerbated in the fall of 1996, as violent clashes erupted in Jimma and Begi (Wollega). Both the 
scale of the conflicts and the level of violence were surprisingly high. There were reports of a group 
calling themselves Kharijites, said to have connections to radical groups in other parts of the 
country and even to Sudan and Yemen, torching numerous churches and even forcefully trying to 
convert Christians to Islam.27 Although further investigations need to be made, the conflict was 
apparently initiated by elements within the Salafi movement, and it is generally assumed that radical 
segments of the movement have been fuelling other conflicts as well. In accordance with the 
general Salafi notion of exclusiveness; both towards Christians and non-Salafi Muslims, groups 
                                                     
24 For more details on the public Ethiopian discourse, see (Alem Zele-Alem 2003; Hibret Selamu 2004; Johannes Sebhatu 
2004) For more details on the contributions by foreign observers, see (De Waal 2004; Shinn 2005)  
25 Medhane Tadesse, author of the book Al-Itihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia, quoted by David Shinn 
(Shinn 2005, 98). 
26 For a survey of such incidents, see (Hussein Ahmed 2006)  
27 Lit. “those who go out” or “outlaws”. The Kharijites were originally a group supporting Ali in his struggle for the 
caliphate, and has been characterised as extremist, rejecting any form of authority. 
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such as the already mentioned Takfir and others have advocated for a stricter separation from the 
Christians. Important to note, however, is that such sentiments have gained meagre support among 
the Salafis at large. Neither the main Salafi ulama in Addis Ababa nor Salafis in the rural areas are 
forwarding views of segregation and enmity towards the Christians. 
 
Although the conflicts in Jimma and Begi were more coordinated than previous ones, and spanned 
over a wider geographical area, inter-religious conflicts in Ethiopia have retained a local character 
and are not part of any nationally organised movement. Many of the conflicts, particularly those in 
the southern areas, need to be related to a broader discourse of historical enmity, which today is 
framed within an ethno-nationalist narrative. On the other hand, the emergence of a stronger 
consciousness among the Muslim population, where past injustices based on religion increasingly 
are being articulated, surely demonstrates that religion is becoming more explicitly distinguished in 
the conflictual pattern.  
 
Rhetoric of a political nature is overtly absent among the Salafis in Ethiopia. Rather than politics, 
the Salafis are focusing on the religious sphere; encouraging a strict adherence to the principle of 
tawhid and avoidance of Sufism and indigenous elements within Islam. Although ideologically 
linked to the Salafi doctrines underscoring the shari’a as the only legitimate law, the Salafis do not 
advocate a similar system for Ethiopia. Recognising the religious plurality of Ethiopia, the 
prevailing view among Ethiopian Salafis is that religious freedom for all could only be secured 
under a secular government. Although an expansion of the shari’a-courts jurisdiction would be 
welcomed by most Salafis, and where more radical elements even would include corporal 
punishments, the Salafis at large realise that the infusion of the shari’a into the governing system 
would be impossible in Ethiopia. 
 
An even clearer avoidance of politics is found within the Tabligh movement.  Statements made by 
the Tabligh movement in general indicate a negative view on politics, where the Tabligh has argued 
for Islamisation of society by the individuals’ efforts; to lead others to Islam and to uphold the 
Islamic virtues. Restricted to conducting da’wa, the movement has thus claimed to be outside of 
politics.28 However, networks created by the organisation have in many areas been exploited by 
various Islamist groupings (Kepel 2002, 45), creating a situation where it often has been equated 
with Islamism. In both Somalia and Uganda this has been the case, where Salafi elements have 
managed to develop Tabligh into a more radical direction (Chande 2000, 355-358; International 
Crises Group 2005, 18). In Ethiopia, the Tabligh has overtly operated in compliance with the 
general principles of the movement, and has through its history been devoid of political 
engagement. Through its low profile and withdrawn to its markaz and to selected mosques in Addis 
Ababa, it has remained rather imperceptible and to a large degree secluded from any involvement in 
public life. 
 
The Intellectualist movement, on the other hand, is the one with the most elaborate view on politics. 
Congruent with their opinion on the need for improved parity between Ethiopia’s religious groups, 
where the Muslims are encouraged to become more involved in political and public affairs, the 
Intellectualists are underscoring the need for a political environment facilitating mutual respect and 
co-existence between the two religious groups. What is of particular interest is the Intellectualists’ 
opinion on the nature of this environment best suited to meet the need of the Muslims of Ethiopia. 
Rather than voicing the views of the Muslim Brotherhood and advocating for Islam being infused 
into politics, they argue that the rights of the country’s different religious groups could only be 
secured under a secular government.  
 
                                                     
28 For an enlightening discussion on Tabligh’s relations towards political activity, see (Sikand 2006). 
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The views held by these movements on politics and their perception on the relationship to the 
Christians, clearly demonstrate how locality impinges on the flow of trans-local ideas into this very 
locality. Construing this dialectic interaction, the questions that consequently emerge are; what are 
the very factors within this locality affecting the global currents, and, how do they affect these 
currents?  
 
On one hand, the long-standing religious plurality and the tradition of relatively peaceful co-
existence in Ethiopia have undoubtedly been contributed in preventing escalation of inter-religious 
conflicts. The pattern of shared commonality on the grass-root level, a degree of mutual respect and 
even, in some areas, transgressions of religious boundaries, in the form of cross-religious marriages 
and even conversions, have served as important resources in preventing conflicts. This tradition has 
also influenced the Islamic movements, making them less likely to embark on a path of a conflictual 
character. On the other hand, the inter-religious relationship in Ethiopia has clearly affected these 
movements’ confidence to explicitly voice their opinions in accordance with their respective 
ideologies. Whereas the Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia have been marked by tolerance and 
coexistence, one crucial aspect of this relationship is its asymmetric character, arguably constituting 
the main reason for the inter-religious tranquillity. Centuries with Christian dominance, a politico-
cultural ideology where Christianity constituted an important part of Ethiopianness, resulted in the 
positioning of the Muslim as second-rate. Excluded from participating in political life, denied any 
representation in the form of organisations and stigmatised, the Muslims were consequently 
secluded from the public sphere and left protective of their limited space. This situation has 
deprived the Muslim community in general, and the emerging Islamic movements in particular of 
the necessary tradition and experience for involvement in the wider Ethiopian society.  
 
Seen in relation to the notion of social identity, the distinction between group identification and 
social categorisation is of particular interest here. Whereas the former constitutes the internal and 
collective identification process and the latter signifies the external categorisation of and by others, 
the dialectics between the two has a clear reciprocal effect in the construction of social identities 
(Jenkins 1996, 80f). In Ethiopia, the Christian politico-cultural hegemony positioning the Muslims 
as subordinate has naturally made an impact on the latter’s self-image, whereby internalising the 
categories issued by the other; the Muslim internal self-image has become a reflection of the 
stigmatisation by the other. This has consequently affected the Muslims’ resources and confidence 
in their quest for increased parity and in carving out public space for themselves. Moreover, it has 
had clear implications for the agenda of the reform movements making them more reluctant to 
challenge the status-quo and causing them to refrain from articulating political views in a radical 
direction. For some of the reform movements, like the Salafi movement, their seclusion to rural 
areas, and subject to linguistic boundaries, has furthermore deprived them of the necessary 
resources to engage in the current societal debates.  
 
Having said this, it needs to be noted that there are efforts made to explicitly address this inbuilt 
sense of inferiority and to inject a new sense of consciousness and pride into the contemporary 
Muslim society. In a series of articles appearing in Bilal (1992-93), dealing with Islam’s history in 
Ethiopia from the Axumite hijrah (the early Muslims escaping to, and being granted asylum in 
Axum in 615 AD) to the present, it was argued that instead of referring to periods of oppressions in 
the past, the time was now ripe for the modern Ethiopian Muslim to start thinking about his long 
and glorious history, and to stand forth with pride (Carmichael 1996).  
 
An increased number of mosques and higher representations of Muslims in public life could hardly 
qualify as proof for a politicisation of Islam in Ethiopia. It has not been uncommon, however, to 
equate demands of better representation with a politicisation of Islam, perhaps reflecting how 
current trends within contemporary Islam accompanied with geopolitical tensions are luring us to 
apply rather narrow categories which unfortunately are limiting our understanding of a dynamic and 
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heterogeneous phenomenon.29 The case of Ethiopia clearly demonstrates how contemporary Islam 
consists of several ideological trends manifested in a variety of movements, and where their local 
manifestations are products of constant negotiations between the trans-local ideological impetus and 
the particularities of the locality.  
Intra-religious tensions and the question of ethnicity  
Besides more fragile Christian-Muslim relations, the emergence and growth of Islamic reform 
movements in Ethiopia has also led to increasing intra-religious tensions. Again, we find the Salafis 
as the one taking the clearest exclusivist stance, expressing strong criticism towards the other 
movements. The Intellectualists, because of their attachment to the Muslim Brotherhood, are by the 
Salafis antagonised as detached from the true Islam, and repeatedly labelled as both Sufis and 
Shi’as – the favourite insults of the Salafis. The Intellectualists, on their part, view the Salafis as 
rigid literalists, as narrow-minded and as ignorant of the diversity of Islamic scholarship. They are 
criticised for separating themselves from the current societal debate, labelled as backward and 
accused of playing a destructive role in the development of the Muslim community in Ethiopia; 
debilitating the unity among the country’s Muslims and creating unnecessary conflicts within the 
community. The Salafis are using similar derogatory labels upon the Tabligh, attacking their 
affiliation with Sufism, and labelling their organised da’wa as bid’a (innovation). The Tabligh, on 
the other hand, have in general kept a low profile, focusing on their da’wa activities and avoiding 
any form of confrontation. Whereas their relationship to the Salafis is rather strained, they are at 
ease with the Intellectualist movement. Both have a positive inclination towards Sufism, although 
the Intellectualists are more critical towards the popularised Sufi practices. 
 
While a religious identity may have gained increased momentum in the last decade, and the notion 
of Islamic unity in Ethiopia on occasions can be invoked particularly with reference to the Christian 
community, the current discourse on ethnicity in Ethiopia has both impinged on the unanimity 
within the Muslim population and led to the reinforcement of existing ideological differences 
between the Islamic movements. With the introduction of ethnic federalism and the current 
regime’s constitutional recognition of Ethiopia’s ethnic patchwork, the question of ethnicity has 
become highly politicised, dominating the public debate throughout the 1990s. Arguably, the 
ongoing debate on ethnicity represents a much broader historical discourse over Ethiopian 
nationhood, where the religious dimension unfortunately has been ignored.  
 
Religious affiliation in Ethiopia is, as in many other parts of Africa, often coinciding with 
membership to a particular ethnic group. This is most apparent among the Somali and the Afar 
where ethnic belonging is equated with being Muslim. Adherence to the reform movements is also 
to some degree coinciding with that of ethnic affinity. In the case of Tabligh, the movement’s links 
to the Gurage community clearly demonstrates how religious and ethnic boundaries are 
overlapping, contributing to confining the movement within a particular ethnic group. The 
Tabligh’s ethnic character must also be seen as a way of expressing the particularity of the Gurage 
trading-community in Addis Ababa. Whereas the Gurage, as a migrant community, would seek to 
demarcate boundaries towards other, either “indigenous” or other migrant groups, this has moreover 
been augmented by the ethnic stratification of Addis Ababa’s Muslim community. In relation to the 
dominating Muslim groups in Addis Ababa, in particular those from Wollo and to some degree the 
Harari, the Gurage have held a subordinate position. Not hosting important scholars and not 
                                                     
29 A relevant example is Chande’s discussion of various Islamic movements in East Africa. Albeit these movements are 
forwarding many of the same views and demands as those discussed in this paper, Chande ends up applying the 
tendentious label of radicalism. See (Chande 2000) 
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influencing the Islamic institutions, the Tabligh has become sort of an identity-marker and a way to 
carve out space for themselves.  
 
The Intellectualist movement is in contrast not confined to any particular ethnic group. The actual 
ethnic composition is somewhat difficult to determine, as the movement is seemingly attracting 
followers from a variety of ethnic groups. On the other hand, the majority is drawn from Amharic-
speaking areas, from Wollo, Gondar and other parts of northern Ethiopia. 
 
Gaining an early foothold among the Oromo of southeast Ethiopia, the Salafi movement has since 
been strong in areas such as Hararge, Bale and Arsi. The movement’s adherents are mainly from the 
Oromo population, with Salafism growing stonger in Jimma area and eastern Wollega.30 The 
Oromo are also dominating the movement in areas outside of Oromiya, clearly seen in Air Tena, the 
centre for the Salafi ulama, where the majority of the residents are from Bale. Here, both ethnic 
affinity and religious affiliation are sought to be maintained, as migrants seek contact with those of 
the same ethnic group and with the same religious preferences. Likewise, the employees in the 
Islamic Da’wa and Knowledge Association and at the Awaliyah School & Mission Centre have 
predominantly been people from the same area. Among the Oromo, the question of ethnicity has 
become overtly politicised, leading to an explicit Oromo ethno-nationalism framed within the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).31 Although sufficient data obviously are lacking, it is highly likely 
to assume that a vast majority of the Oromo support the views and policies of OLF. It is moreover 
clear that the Oromo Salafis are holding similar views as the rest of the Oromo people; either 
advocating for better representation of the Oromo within the Ethiopian state or the formation of an 
independent Oromo state. For example, when the OLF soldiers took control over Bale in 1991, the 
political preferences of both the Muslim population and the Salafi ulama became overtly apparent. 
During that summer, the main mosque in Robe (the provincial capital of Bale) was decorated with 
OLF flags and banners and the ulama were explicitly voicing their support for the movement. 
Describing the existing fervour when the OLF soldiers entered Robe, one of the sheikhs of Robe 
said; ‘had it not been for the laws of Islam, we would have danced with joy’. Today, OLF enjoys 
similar support, both from the people and the religious leadership, revealing the strong position of 
Oromo ethnic nationalism in Bale. Interesting to note is that rather than the idea of the Ummah – a 
community based on religious exclusiveness, it is Oromumma – a community based on ethnic 
exclusiveness that is advocated by many of the ulama of Robe. One of the sheikhs went as far as 
saying; ‘what we are talking about is a struggle for the freedom of the Oromo; an ethnic jihad’. Yet, 
at the same time, the interrelationship between religion and ethnicity remains complex. Until the 
last years of the Derg, the Muslim Oromo of Bale commonly referred to themselves as Islaamaa; as 
marking their religious affiliation, but also as a term defining them as an ethnic group within the 
locality of Bale. Today, Islaamaa is replaced by Oromo, both revealing that identity has 
transcended the boundary of locality, and the introduction of a conceptual distinction between 
religious and ethnic affiliation. Nevertheless, even if the ongoing religious changes have created a 
stronger Muslim identity among the Oromo, the prevailing point of orientation remains ‘being 
Oromo’. Even the young Salafis, who put great zeal into their religious practices, subscribe to the 
notion of Oromumma, and view OLF as the legitimate liberators of the Oromo. Both among the 
religious leadership and the rest of the Muslim community, faith is considered an individual matter; 
by which man identifies himself in relation to God. Ethnicity is the collective identity marker, by 
which the individual identifies himself in relation to the collective; first as an Arsi Oromo, secondly 
as an Oromo in the wider sense and thirdly, as distinguished from other ethnic groups in Ethiopia.  
                                                     
30 There are some indications that the Salafi Islam is gaining support among the Silte group. So far, no studies have been 
made on this relationship. For some suggestions, see (Zerihun Abebe 2004).  
31 Formed in the early 1970s, OLF was engaged in an armed struggle against the Derg regime, and participated with 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front and other movements in ousting the regime in 1991. OLF also constituted one of the 
main parties in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) formed in June 1991, but left the TGE already in February 
1992. Today OLF is banned in Ethiopia as it is pursuing an armed struggle against the present regime.   
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Membership to a given reform movement and to a certain ethnic group can thus be seen as part of 
the process of identification, where the religious and ethnic aspects are having a reciprocal and 
reinforcing effect. This intrinsic relationship between religion and ethnicity has moreover affected 
the intra-religious situation within the Muslim community, enhancing the antagonism between the 
different reform movements. Clearly noticeable, is how the current discourse on ethnicity is situated 
alongside existing ideological divergence, and where references are made to symbols of both a 
religious and an ethnic character – consequently leading in the reinforcement of both religious and 
ethnic boundaries.  
 
Categories with a clear ethnic flavour are clearly detectable among the Salafis (Oromo), which are 
forwarding self-representations of a clear primordial nature, emphasising the quality of the Oromo 
as a whole for discovering and upholding the true tenets of Islam (i.e. the Salafi doctrines of Islam). 
This is moreover reflected in the derogatory labels they apply on other Muslim groups in Ethiopia. 
In the case of Tabligh, the categories used by the Salafis are interchangeably drawn from a religious 
terminology and characteristics with clear ethnic connotations. In either way, the Gurage are 
equated as Tabligh, where they both as an ethnic group and as a religious movement are labelled as 
deviators of the true Islam, as Sufis and as mushrikin. Similar derogatory representations are used 
for the Muslims of Wollo; the Wolloyyans as a collective are seen as Sufis and neglecters of the true 
Islam. Also accused of religious laxness, this is something being explained by their acquiescence to 
the Christian Amhara. The Salafis are on the other hand despised, particularly by the Intellectualist 
movement as backward literalists. One of my informants described a prominent Oromo Salafi alim 
as ‘a Saudi-educated shepherd from Bale’, revealing prejudice of a clear ethnic nature. Although the 
Intellectualist movement has been the movement most explicitly advocating Muslim unity 
regardless of ethnic affiliation, arguing that Islam is to transcend the boundaries of ethnicity, the 
movement appears to adhere to the notion of a centralised and unitary Ethiopia, a view commonly 
held by the Amhara population; of a unitary and centralised country, in contrast to the federal 
structure recognising Ethiopia’s ethnic pluralism. This ethno-religious diversity was further 
detectable in the course of Ethiopia’s interventions in Somalia in the latter part of 2006. In general, 
there was a clear, yet silent opposition to the war from the country’s Muslim community, but had 
the fighting escalated, it is clear that this could easily have divided the Muslims of Ethiopia. The 
Muslims of the north, harbouring a stronger nationalistic sentiment, would have been more 
supportive to the regime, while the Muslims in the south, the Oromo and obviously the Somali – 
would have been more opposed to the intervention. Instead, they would have supported the Somali 
claim for Greater Somalia as legitimate, and seen prolonged unrest in the southern areas as an 
opportunity to strengthen their own claims for independence.  
 
In turn, this leads us to the question of the force of Islam in transcending local boundaries. What 
seems apparent is that the lack of trans-ethnic and trans-regional cooperation is affecting the 
potential Islam has as a force for wider allegiance. Contrary to the views held by most Muslims in 
general of Islam being a religion transcending any boundary in uniting the faithful, the case of 
Ethiopia reveals the recognition of diversity not only within the Ethiopian society, but also among 
the Muslims, something not even a trans-local movement of reform like Salafi Islam has managed 
to supersede. Illustrating the recurrent strength of locality in an overriding process of globalisation, 
the case of Ethiopia certainly reveals the power of inherent boundaries, and how they can be re-
invoked and reinterpreted for the purpose of constructing new identities. Where some writers have 
argued that the prevailing strength of the ethnic diversity would hinder the future growth of a trans-
national politicised Islam in Ethiopia (Abbas Haji Gnamo 2002, 114; Abbink 1998, 123), I would 
claim that such a conclusion may be too hastened. The post-1991 period, marked by increased 
communications with the wider Islamic world has created potentials for the evolvement of trans-
local and trans-national Islamic movements. Yet again; it is the currents within the locality marred 
with events on the trans-local that will determine the future. 
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Conclusion 
The Islamic reform movements discussed here have been the carriers of a wide range of activities 
within the post-1991 Ethiopian Muslim community. These movements have to a large degree 
reshaped the position of Islam in Ethiopia in a way unprecedented in history. In addition, they have 
also been pivotal channels for the re-construction of identity for the country’s Muslims. Through 
this process of identification, the issue of religious identity has become more articulated and 
objectified; involving the recognition of differences and the demarcation of boundaries; both intra- 
and inter-religious, which in turn have been marred with the rather politicised discourse on 
ethnicity. As movements of religious resurgence focusing on the revival of Islamic virtues among 
the believers, they have been pivotal in providing points of orientation and meaning, and moreover 
mending the discontinuity of identity. This particular case also demonstrates how the flow of ideas 
into a locality involves a dialectic process where ideological imperatives, political discourses and 
inherent affinities mutually and reciprocally inform and affect each other. My hope is that a case-
study as this could serve as an example for the need to recognise Islamism as a heterogeneous 
phenomenon only to be fully understood in light of a variety of contexts. Whereas contemporary 
Islamic movements in Ethiopia have been charged of having a political agenda, I have argued that 
these movements are less inclined to struggle for the inclusion of Islam in politics than assumed. 
Radical Islamic ideas may have limited support among the Muslims of Ethiopia as long as the 
ethnic card remains prevalent, yet it remains clear, however, that both developments on the global 
and regional arenas together with the inter-religious legacy of the Ethiopian past could contribute to 
radicalise Islam, and to increase inter-religious tensions. Therefore, recognising the role and force 
of religion in contemporary Ethiopia becomes imperative.  
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SUMMARY
Ethiopia’s new political climate (since 1991) has enhanced the Muslims’ op-
portunities for religious expressions, clearly seen through the surfacing 
of several Islamic reform movements. These movements; the Salafi move-
ment, the Tabligh movement and an Intellectualist revivalist movement 
have proven crucial for a certain process of objectification of religious af-
filiation, and have moreover served as channels for the search for belong-
ing and coherent meaning among the Muslims. Discussing the movements’ 
socio-cultural composition and their ideological content, this paper pays 
attention to how features of locality interact with trans-local ideological 
currents, reciprocally affecting each other. Of particular interest in the 
Ethiopian case is the explicit avoidance of any political agenda, a distinct 
intermarriage with a discourse on ethnicity, where the latter has contrib-
uted to complex processes of constructing and demarcating religious- and 
ethnic-based boundaries. The paper thus seeks to demonstrate the com-
plex interrelationship between global currents and local factors; all con-
tributing to the heterogenisation of contemporary Islam.
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